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Intrusive recollections are very common immediately after traumatic
events and are considered necessary aspects of emotional processing. How-
ever, if these intrusive recollections persist over a long time, they are linked
to long-term psychiatric disorder, especially Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD). This paper discusses the need to investigate factors
involved in the maintenance of intrusive traumatic recollections. It is
suggested that the idiosyncratic meaning of the intrusive recollections
predicts the distress caused by them, and the degree to which the indi-
vidual engages in strategies to control the intrusions. These control
strategies maintain the intrusive recollections by preventing a change in
the meaning of the trauma and of the traumatic memories. It is further
suggested that what is needed is a comprehensive assessment of the
processes that prevent change in meaning, going beyond the assessment of
avoidance. In particular, safety behaviours, dissociation and numbing, sup-
pression of memories and thoughts about trauma, rumination, activation
of other emotions such as anger and guilt and corresponding cognitions,
and selective information processing (attentional and memory biases) may
be involved in the maintenance of intrusive recollections. Preliminary
data supporting these suggestions from studies of individuals involved
in road traffic accidents and survivors of child sexual abuse are described.
Introduction
Even months and years after a traumatic event, patients with Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) continue to involuntarily reexperience aspects of the
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trauma. Reexperiencing can take the form of images, thoughts, perceptions,
flashbacks, or dreams of the trauma. These intrusive recollections are often
considered the hallmark symptoms of PTSD (Calhoun and Resick, 1993;
Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum, 1989). They cause significant distress and
interfere with the patient's functioning.
The focus of previous work on intrusive recollections, and PTSD symp-
toms in general, has been on the question of what factors determine whether
or not an individual develops psychological symptoms after experiencing a
traumatic event. This question is crucial and in many ways the most obvious
to study. However, it may not be sufficient in explaining PTSD. The aim
of the present article is to argue that for a full understanding of the
nature of PTSD, research will have to clarify which factors determine
the maintenance of PTSD symptoms. Research on rape and assault victims
has demonstrated that the majority of victims meet the criteria for PTSD
in the weeks following the trauma (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock and
Walsh, 1992; for reviews see Kilpatrick and Resick, 1993; Rothbaum
and Foa, 1993). While the majority recover in the course of the following
year, a proportion show persistent symptoms. Research on other types of
trauma has often found a lower prevalence of PTSD, but nevertheless
symptoms of PTSD such as intrusive recollections were very common
immediately after the trauma (e.g., Shalev, 1992; Shalev, Schreiber and Galai,
1993). Thus, it seems to be important to determine which factors explain
maintenance versus recovery in individuals initially showing the character-
istic posttraumatic symptoms as specified in the DSM-IV diagnoses Acute
Stress Disorder or PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) after a
traumatic event.
The need to clarify which factors determine maintenance particularly
applies to intrusive memories of the trauma since most researchers agree
that for the period immediately following the trauma, reexperiencing is a
sign of normal adaptation. For example, Eberly, Harkness and Engdahl
(1991) pointed out that in a traumatic environment "intrusive replaying of
trauma in dreams and while awake allows the organism to rehearse covertly
alternative responses and contemplate the overall unpleasantness of the
situation so that avoidance or escape from the life-threatening situation
becomes more likely if encountered again" (p. 367). Persistent intrusive
memories, on the other hand, are linked to poor long-term outcome and
may be involved in maintaining the disorder: "... intrusive memories may
be a primary mechanism by which the experience of stress was extended
beyond the presence of the stressor" (Baum, Cohen and Hall, 1993, p. 282).
This paper is concerned with possible cognitive factors involved in the
maintenance of intrusive memories in PTSD. It presents a brief overviewIntrusions in PTSD 219
of cognitive factors established in previous research as well as suggestions
for possible further cognitive processes that may maintain intrusive mem-
ories. These suggestions are supported by preliminary findings from our
studies on individuals involved in road traffic accidents and survivors of
child sexual abuse.
It is not the aim of this paper to present a complete overview of possible
variables contributing to the development of PTSD (e.g., variables such as
prior psychiatric history or prior life events; see Jones and Barlow, 1990,
for a review). It is also outside the scope of this paper to review possible
biological factors involved in PTSD symptoms. We do not see biological
and cognitive factors as mutually exclusive and assume that cognitive pro-
cesses have biological correlates (see, for example, the relationship of numb-
ing and endogenous opiates, Glover, 1992; van der Kolk and Saporta, 1991;
relationships of hyperarousal, stress hormones, and disturbances in memory,
van der Kolk and Saporta, 1991; or a possible relationship between stress
hormones and overconsolidation of memories, Baum et al., 1993).
Cognitive factors involved in the development of PTSD symptoms
Individuals exposed to the same trauma differ widely in the degree of their
distress. This points to the role of cognitive factors in that it seems to be
important how an individual perceives the trauma and what meaning the
trauma has for him or her. Psychological models and empirical studies have
addressed cognitive factors that might explain the range of reactions to
trauma. Since these provide the background for the discussion of mainten-
ance, a few important factors are now described, with some examples of
research findings supporting the role of these factors.
Unpredictability and uncontrollability
Most authors agree that the experience of unpredictability and uncontrolla-
bility represent a core cognitive factor for the development of PTSD
(Davidson and Foa, 1993; Foa, Zinbarg and Rothbaum, 1992; Jones and
Barlow, 1990; Rachman, 1990). "For the victim of an uncontrollable, unpre-
dictable important stressor, daily life is marked by a sense of impending
doom because threat pertinent to his or her survival can neither be predicted
nor controlled" (Foa et al, 1992, p. 231). Foa et al. (1989, 1992) specified
that the concept should be understood as perceived controllability and
predictability rather than actual contingencies and that controllability may
even play a more pivotal role that predictability in determining PTSD
outcomes. In line with this hypothesis, prospective data from individuals
living near the Three Mile Island nuclear accident showed that perceived
loss of control was a significant mediator of stress response (Baum et al.,220 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
1993). For a review of further studies supporting the role of unpredictability
and uncontrollability of the trauma, the reader is referred to Jones and
Barlow (1990) and Foa et al. (1992). Further aspects of control are discussed
elsewhere; for example, the perception of unexercised control (Foa et al.,
1989) and the role of disruption of expectations of control (Baum et
al, 1993).
Perceived threat vs. actual danger
Research indicates that the perception of threat is at least as important in
predicting the severity of PTSD symptoms as objective indicators of actual
danger (Foa et al., 1992). For example, Kilpatrick et al. (1989) found that
rape victims who perceived the assault to be life-threatening were more
likely to develop PTSD than those who did not think their life was in
danger. In contrast, whether or not a weapon was used in the crime was
not related to PTSD. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis showed that
perceived threat to life explained a proportion of the variance of develop-
ment of PTSD not explained by physical injuries sustained during the
assault. Using path analysis, Riggs, Foa, Rothbaum and Murdock (1991)
found that for rape and crime victims, the relationship between severity of
assault and severity of PTSD was mediated by perceived threat to the
victim's life. In a questionnaire study of 375 subjects involved in road traffic
accidents, the perceived threat to life was also related to severity of PTSD
symptoms (Steil and Ehlers, in preparation). The same result was obtained
in a three-month prospective study of road traffic accident victims (Winter
and Ehlers, in preparation).
An aspect of perceived threat that has not been adequately addressed in
the existing literature is the fact that an individual's memory of how threat-
ening the event was may change over time (see for example Schwarz,
Kowalksi and McNally, 1993) and new information may be incorporated
into the memories of perceived threat. Foa et al. (1989) described the case
of a rape patient who only developed PTSD after hearing that the per-
petrator had killed his next victim. In a questionnaire survey of 159 indi-
viduals involved in road traffic accidents, subjects meeting the criteria for
PTSD did not differ in their ratings of how threatening they perceived the
accident while it happened from subjects without PTSD. However, signifi-
cant differences were found when subjects rated how threatening the acci-
dent appeared from today's perspective (Steil and Ehlers, in preparation).
Parallels exist between these observations and the phenomenon of UCS
revaluation in conditioning (Davey, 1989).Intrusions in PTSD 221
Causal attributions
There is some evidence that causal attributions are related to the develop-
ment of PTSD (see Joseph, Yule and Williams, 1993 for a review). Subjects
with PTSD tend to attribute the trauma to more internal causes than trauma-
tized individuals without PTSD. There is also evidence that general attri-
butional style is correlated with PTSD in that individuals with PTSD show
more externality for positive outcomes. Evidence for negative outcomes is
mixed and might depend on the type of trauma (Joseph et al., 1993).
Wenninger and Ehlers (submitted) found that highly symptomatic survivors
of child sexual abuse attributed negative events to more internal, stable, and
global causes than mildly symptomatic survivors. In a prospective study of
individuals involved in road traffic accidents, subjects who met criteria for
PTSD were more likely to attribute negative events to internal causes than
subjects who did not develop PTSD (Winter and Ehlers, in preparation).
Effects of trauma on beliefs
Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983) hypothesized that psychological symp-
toms develop after a trauma if an individual's basic assumptions about the
fairness and safety of the world are shattered. Other authors have also
emphasized the perception of loss of safety/increased risk in PTSD patients
(e.g., Foa et al., 1989). Foa and Riggs (1993) and Resick and Schicke (1993)
pointed out that the trauma may not only shatter previous beliefs but may
also confirm preexisting maladaptive beliefs. Individuals with exaggerated
notions about the safety of the world and about their personal invulner-
ability, and individuals with exaggerated ideas of danger and personal incom-
petence may be more likely to develop PTSD than individuals with more
flexible schemata (Foa and Riggs, 1993). In general, the trauma may have
different implications on the individual's view of themselves, their relation-
ships with other people, and their expectations for their future. For example,
persistent PTSD in rape victims is thought to be due to maladaptive cog-
nitions the victim develops because the assault conflicted with prior schem-
ata in themes such as safety, self-esteem, competence, trust and intimacy
(Calhoun and Resick, 1993; McCann and Perlman, 1990). In line with
this assumption, Wenninger and Ehlers (submitted) found high correlations
between dysfunctional beliefs in these themes and trauma-related symptoms
in adult survivors of child sexual abuse. These correlations were not
mediated by severity of assault.222 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
Coping strategies
In their review of the literature, Jones and Barlow (1990) pointed out that
coping strategies may be an important variable moderating an individual's
response to a trauma. Active problem-focused processing strategies seem to
be linked to better outcome than avoidance or emotion-focused strategies
such as distancing or wishful thinking (see for example, Fairbank, Hansen
and Fitterling, 1991; Solomon, Mikulincer and Avitzur, 1988; Solomon,
Mikulincer and Flum, 1988). In line with this hypothesis, a coping style
characterized by the factor escape/avoidance as measured by the Ways of
Coping Scale predicted severity of PTSD symptoms three months after
road traffic accidents (Winter and Ehlers, in preparation).
Cognitive mediation of other variables
Some other variables that have consistently been found to be linked to
outcome in individuals who are exposed to traumatic events may also be
mediated by cognitive processes. An example is social support, which is
linked to good outcome (see Flannery, 1990; Jones and Barlow, 1990). Little
is known about the mechanisms by which social support prevents the
development or maintenance of PTSD symptoms and one can only speculate
about possibilities. For example, social support may give the individual a
sense of controllability (Jones and Barlow, 1990), confiding in others may be
therapeutic (Pennebaker, 1989), and social support may prevent maladaptive
interpretations of trauma (such as "I will not be able to have close relation-
ships again", "I am worthless"). Feeling detached from others may represent
a form of dissociation which prevents adjustment (see suggestion 2 below),
and loss of social support may represent a long-lasting loss of resources
(Freedy, Shaw, Jarrell and Masters, 1992).
Conclusions
Previous research has established a number of cognitive factors that are
involved in the development or maintenance of PTSD symptoms after
traumatic events. The focus of cognitive theories and research has been on
the individual's perception of the trauma. Two research strategies may
increase the explanatory power of cognitive factors in PTSD. First, a clearer
distinction of factors linked to the first development of PTSD symptoms
and those determining their persistence may be useful. Because most studies
to date are retrospective, there is a lack of data relevant to this distinction.
Second, cognitive factors involved in the maintenance of PTSD may go
beyond those related to the trauma itself and may include the patients'Intrusions in PTSD 223
interpretations of their PTSD symptoms, as in panic disorder (Clark, 1986;
Ehlers, Margraf and Roth, 1988).
Research on intrusive recollections in PTSD
Descriptive information on the occurrence of intrusive memories
Some authors have found that avoidance symptoms are more persistent
than symptoms of the reexperiencing cluster (for a review see Blank, 1992).
However, a closer inspection of the data shows that differences exist between
the different symptoms of the reliving cluster. A study of survivors of the
Buffalo Creek dam collapse (cited from Green, 1993) found that while
nightmares and flashback were relatively uncommon 14 years after the
disaster, intrusive thoughts and psychological and physiological distress
when confronted with reminders of the trauma were among the most
common long-term symptoms of PTSD. In a three-month prospective
longitudinal study of 39 individuals involved in road traffic accidents,
Winter and Ehlers (in preparation) obtained similar results. Three months
after the accident, 48% of the subjects still experienced intrusive recollec-
tions and 54% experienced distress when confronted with reminders of the
trauma, whereas only 10% experienced nightmares and 26% flashbacks.
Cognitive avoidance was reported by 31% of the subjects, and behavioural
avoidance by 39%.
It is important here to note that the label "intrusive thoughts" that has
been used by some authors to represent criterion Bl of DSM-III-R and
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is misleading because
intrusive recollections include images of the traumatic event. Brett and
Ostroff (1985) remarked that the role of imagery is under investigated in
PTSD. To date, there are insufficient data about the nature of intrusive
recollections. According to our results, visual recollections are the most
common form of intrusions. In a study of 35 adult survivors of child sexual
abuse, Wenninger and Ehlers (in preparation) found that 97% reported
visual recollections (51% in the resembling "film clips", 46% resembling
single pictures), 66% somatosensory sensations, 51% sounds or smells, and
26% thoughts.
Steil and Ehlers (in preparation) obtained similar results in a sample of
159 individuals who had experienced road traffic accidents. 65% of the
subjects reported visual recollections resembling "film clips", 69% seeing
single pictures, 54% sounds or smells, 48% somatosensory sensations, 45%
thoughts, and 33% felt as if they were repeating actions performed during
the accident. Furthermore, Steil and Ehlers (in preparation) obtained distress
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of the reliving cluster were rated as more distressing than symptoms of the
avoidance/numbing and arousal clusters. Visual recollections were rated as
more distressing than other recollections.
Taken together, these results suggest that models explaining maintenance
of traumatic memories need to take their visual quality into account. The
predominance of intrusive visual images might be an important difference
between PTSD and other anxiety disorders with frequent intrusions such
as Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD).
Maintenance of intrusive memories in models of PTSD
There is general agreement that reexperiencing is necessary for emotional
processing (see Rachman, 1990) and is thus to be expected in all traumatized
individuals for a certain period after a trauma. From differing theoretical
perspectives, Horowitz (1976) and Foa et al. (1989) have both suggested
that intrusive memories persist if emotional processing is prevented or
incomplete due to avoidance strategies (see also Chemtob, Roiblat, Hamada,
Carlson and Twentyman, 1988; Janov-Bulman, 1985).
According to Horowitz (1976), intrusive memories facilitate information
processing of the trauma by two processes, first, incorporation of the trauma
into existing schemata, and second, by the development of new schemata
that take the trauma into account. Avoidance and numbing are seen as
control processes that prevent the individual from becoming overwhelmed
by the memories. Horowitz describes the adaptation process as an oscil-
lation between denial and numbing on the one hand and intrusive memories
on the other hand. Excessive control of the intrusive memories, however,
will prevent complete processing of the trauma and thus prolong the adap-
tation process. The trauma will stay in active memory and intrusions will
continue to occur.
On the basis of Lang's (1977) network model of emotion, Foa et al.
(1989) suggested that traumatic events create especially large and complex
fear networks because of their significance and because they violate formerly
held basic concepts of safety. Because of their complexity, fear networks of
PTSD patients can easily be activated by a wide range of stimuli. This
leads to a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability and is involved in
maintaining the disorder. According to Foa et al. (1989) the persistence of
PTSD can be explained by inadequate activation of the fear network due
to several mechanisms: avoidance strategies and numbing prevent an
adequately long activation of the fear network, the complex network may
not be activated entirely because not enough matching cues are present or
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(Foa and Riggs, 1993), and/or excessively high arousal impedes habituation
and processing of new information.
Relationship of intrusive memories, avoidance, and psychiatric disorder
Models of PTSD differ in the relationship proposed between intrusion and
avoidance. Horowitz (1976) and Chemtob et al. (1988) distinguish phases
of intrusive memories accompanied by high arousal and phases of arousal-
reducing avoidance as separate modes of functioning. The patient is thought
to oscillate between these modes. Chemtob et al. (1988) assume that the
mode characterized by hypervigilance for threat, intrusions, and high arou-
sal and the mode characterized by avoidance of threat and reduction of
arousal represent two separate network nodes in memory which mutually
inhibit each other. Foa et al. (1989) and Creamer, Burgess and Pattison
(1992) see avoidance as a direct part of the fear structure associated with
the trauma (the fear structure is a program to escape or avoid danger) and
emphasize that intrusions motivate the patient to avoid reminders of the
trauma.
Recent research supports the view of a functional relationship between
intrusions and avoidance. McFarlane (1992a) studied firefighters exposed to
a bushfire over a period of 42 months. Using path analysis, he demonstrated
that intrusive recollections predicted degree of avoidance at all time points
(4, 11, and 29 months, N=395). Creamer, Burgess and Pattison (1990) ana-
lysed two data sets (one of an earlier study of McFarlane) with path analyses
and found that, consistent with McFarlane's (1992a) data, intrusions precede
avoidance. Similarly, in a 14-month prospective study of 158 individuals
exposed to a multiple shooting in their office building (Creamer et al., 1992)
intrusions predicted avoidance, but not vice versa, at all time points (4, 8,
and 14 months).
At first sight, the path analysis models presented by Creamer et al. (1992)
and MacFarlane (1992a) on the role of intrusive recollections in predicting
long-term psychiatric symptoms after exposure to a trauma seem to differ.
McFarlane (1992a) found that intrusive recollections measured at 4 months
predicted psychiatric disorder (PTSD, other anxiety disorder, or depression,
according to DSM-III criteria) at 42 months (iV=147). Interestingly, avoid-
ance did not have an independent relationship to the disorder. Like MacFar-
lane (1992a), Creamer et al. (1992) found positive correlations between
intrusions at earlier phases and subsequent SCL-90R scores (which were
used in this study as an indicator of psychiatric disorder—intrusions at 4
month with SCL-90R at 8 months: r = .60, with SCL-90R at 14 months:
r = .54). LISREL modelling showed that intrusive recollections resulted in
higher SCL-90R scores, but not vice versa, at all time points. Intrusions at226 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
earlier stages showed strong positive relationships with subsequent
intrusions (which were linked with higher SCL-90R scores at that time
point), and small but significantly negative relationships with subsequent
SCL-90R scores. The authors interpret the latter finding as meaning that
intrusions at earlier stages are a sign of cognitive processing and are therefore
related to reduced symptoms in the long-term. However, one has to bear
in mind that intrusions at earlier stages and SCL-90R scores at later stages
correlated positively (as in McFarlane's, 1992a, study). The pattern of results
seems to indicate that a proportion of the variance of intrusive recollections
at earlier phases is not predictive of subsequent intrusive memories, and it
is that part of the variance that shows a negative relationship to subsequent
psychiatric disorder. However, most of the variance of intrusive recollections
at 4 months seems to predict poor long-term outcome, as in MacFarlane's
model. A consistent finding of both studies is that intrusive recollections,
but not avoidance, predicted psychiatric impairment about one year after
the trauma.
Another interesting finding of the Creamer et al. (1992) study is that the
link between intrusive memories and avoidance is close a few months after
the event but that the size of the correlation decreases over time (although
MacFarlane, 1992a, found similarly high regression coefficients for all time
points). Other authors have also pointed out that correlations between
avoidance and intrusive memories is often low, especially if measured a long
time after the trauma. This has led authors to conclude that other factors
than intrusions contribute to avoidance behaviour (e.g., Burstein, 1989a).
For example, MacFarlane (1992a, 1992b) suggested that avoidance presents
a variable reaction to the intrusive recollections and may partially reflect
the individual's personality such as neuroticism or genetic differences. Using
cross-lagged panel correlations, MacFarlane (1992a) found a positive feed-
back process between intrusive recollections and symptoms of anxiety and
depression. As we will discuss below, cognitive variables that may mediate
an individual's response to having intrusive recollections should also be
taken into account (see suggestion 1). Furthermore, the inclusion of more
subtle forms of avoidance may be important (see suggestion 2).
Relationship of intrusive memories and distress
Most of the earlier work on PTSD implicitly assumed that intrusive mem-
ories are direct expressions of trauma-induced distress (see for example
Creamer et al., 1990; Feinstein and Dolan, 1991; MacFarlane, 1992a), and
the intrusions scale of the Impact of Event Scale (IES, Horowitz, Wilner
and Alvarez, 1979) which assesses how often intrusive symptoms are experi-Intrusions in PTSD 227
enced has been widely used to assess psychological distress induced by the
trauma.
Preliminary studies, however, indicate that individuals vary in the degree
to which they find intrusive recollections distressing. Shalev et al. (1993)
observed that during the week after the trauma, all survivors of a terrorist
attack experienced intrusive thoughts and images, but that "substantial dif-
ferences between individual's capacity to tolerate the intrusive phenomena
were present. These were expressed by the amount of distress and arousal
associated with the emergence of traumatic recollection" (p. 446). Similar
findings from our research of individuals involved in road traffic accidents
are described below (Steil and Ehlers, in preparation). Mayou, Bryant and
Duthie (1993) found that if patients described their intrusive recollections
of road traffic accidents as "horrific" (which can be taken as a sign of
distress) they were likely to meet criteria for PTSD at 1-year follow-up.
Although it is difficult to equate for the exact content of the intrusive
recollections in these studies, they point to the important distinction
between frequency of intrusions and distress caused by them. The latest
revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) has added a distress criterion
to take into account that the occurrence of symptoms does not necessarily
reflect intensity of distress.
The failure to distinguish between frequency of intrusive recollections
and the distress caused by them in most previous research on PTSD is
somewhat surprising, given that Rachman's group (e.g., Parkinson and
Rachman, 1981; Rachman and de Silva, 1978) has demonstrated that the
occurrence of unwanted thoughts does not necessarily mean that they are
distressing and that frequency of unwanted intrusive thoughts represents a
different factor from discomfort and controllability factors. If applied to
PTSD, the fact that not all individuals find the intrusions distressing could
possibly explain the relatively low correlations between avoidance and the
occurrence of intrusive memories at later stages of the disorder (see previous
section). It is conceivable that the distress caused by intrusions rather than
the frequency of their occurrence predicts avoidance, especially if assess-
ments are taken long after the trauma. No published studies have investi-
gated this hypothesis, and scales assessing severity of PTSD are measures
of symptom presence/absence or frequency (Impact of Event Scale, IES,
Horowitz et al., 1979; PTSD Symptom Scale, PSS, Foa, Riggs, Dancu and
Rothbaum, 1993).
Preliminary data supporting the role of distress caused by intrusions are
discussed below (Steil and Ehlers, in preparation). The variability in distress
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different meanings of the intrusive memories for the individual (see sugges-
tion 1).
The need to distinguish different phases of the disorder in establishing links
between intrusions and persistent PTSD
An important finding of prospective studies of PTSD is that the experience
of intrusive recollections immediately after the trauma is often not a good
predictor of persistent PTSD (in terms of specificity) (McFarlane, 1988;
Perry, Difede, Musngi, Frances and Jacobsberg, 1992; Shalev, 1992; but see
the positive results for 3-month longitudinal studies of Rothbaum et al.,
1992, and Winter and Ehlers, in preparation). McFarlane (1992b) mentioned
that the presence of intrusive memories and avoidance in itself is not suf-
ficient in differentiating adaptive trauma-related distress from the presence
of PTSD "... the clinical significance of intrusive phenomena in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the trauma is different from that 3 to 4 months later" (p.
599). Like Shalev (1992), McFarlane (1992b) assumed that arousal symptoms
are crucial in predicting persistent PTSD.
However, this hypothesis does not explain why intrusions measured after
several months have elapsed (4 months or later) were an important predictor
of persistent PTSD in the studies of MacFarlane (1992a), Perry et al. (1992)
and Baum et al. (1993). The difference in pattern of results indicates that it
is important to distinguish between factors determining the development of
initial PTSD symptoms and those involved in their maintenance, as men-
tioned in the introduction.
A cognitive approach to the maintenance of intrusive recollections
In the following, we will discuss two suggestions for future research that
are based on the considerations described above and the literature on other
anxiety disorders (especially Salkovskis, 1985, in press) and depression
(Teasdale and Barnard, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews, 1988).
Preliminary results from our studies are presented. The suggestions are:
1. The idiosyncratic meaning of the intrusive recollections contributes to
the persistence of the intrusions.
2. A comprehensive assessment of strategies used by the patient to control
the occurrence of intrusive recollections is necessary to explain persistence
of intrusive recollections. These strategies prevent change of negative idio-
syncratic meanings of the trauma and of the intrusions.Intrusions in PTSD 229
Suggestion 1: Role of negative idiosyncratic meaning of intrusions in
persistent PTSD
We suggest that the patients' interpretations (i.e., the idiosyncratic meaning)
of their intrusive recollections determine:
1. How distressing the intrusions are.
2. The extent to which the patient engages in strategies to control the
intrusions.
3. These strategies prevent a change of meaning of the trauma and of the
intrusive recollections. Thus, as a consequence of 2, they contribute to
the maintenance of intrusive recollections and PTSD symptoms in general
(see suggestion 2 for possible mechanisms).
We define the content of negative interpretations of intrusive recollections
as follows: The traumatized individual interprets intrusive memories as a
sign of threat. In particular, the individual interprets the fact that the intrus-
ive recollection has occurred and/or its particular content as indicating the
possibility (but not certainty) of
• something negative about themselves which he/she finds unacceptable, or
• an ongoing threat that their world (i.e., their social relationships) presents
to him/her, or
• a permanent damage that may have been done to him/herself (i.e., physi-
cal or mental health) or their world (i.e., their social relationships) which
prevents him/her from going back to his/her normal life.
These negative interpretations lead to a sense of ongoing threat (anticipation
of future negative events), and loss of a positive perspective for the future.
Note that we use the term interpretations in a broad sense. They include
conscious appraisals that take the form of automatic thoughts as described
by Beck (1976) and network associations with particular meanings as
described by Lang (1977). What is important for our hypotheses is that
the individual assigns a negative idiosyncratic meaning to his/her intrusive
recollections that meets the criteria described above.
Examples of these negative interpretations are:
• A survivor of child sexual abuse interprets the intrusions as meaning she/
he is about to go crazy.
• A patient involved in a road traffic accident interprets the intrusions as
a sign of a brain injury.
• Another accident patient interprets the intrusions as indicating that she/
he is going to suffer forever.230 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
• A rape patient interprets the intrusions as meaning she/he is inadequate
because she/he cannot cope with stress.
• A patient experiencing intrusive memories during a conversation with a
friend interprets these as indicating that she/he will never be able to form
a close relationship with other people again.
The negative interpretation of intrusive recollections usually reflects mala-
daptive beliefs that the individual held before experiencing the trauma (e.g.,
beliefs about how long it is appropriate to be upset, beliefs about psycho-
logical symptoms). The interpretations may also be linked to a maladaptive
belief formed as a result of the patient's interpretation of the trauma. In the
latter case, the intrusive recollection may be interpreted as providing further
confirmation of the interpretation of the trauma. For example, a patient
who was injured due to the reckless driving of another driver developed
the belief that the world is unjust. He interpreted the fact that he suffered
from very distressing intrusions as yet another indication of this injustice.
We expect that patients for whom their intrusive memories have a negative
meaning as described above experience more distress and are more likely
to engage in strategies to control the intrusions (see suggestion 2) than
patients who think the intrusions are a normal part of recovery. Since
strategies employed to control the occurrence of intrusions prevent change
in meaning, negative interpretations of intrusive memories should therefore
contribute to the persistence of intrusions and other PTSD symptoms. It is
also possible that maladaptive interpretations of intrusive recollections actu-
ally lead to changes in the traumatic memories themselves. Indirect evidence
for the latter hypothesis comes from a study of Schwarz et al. (1993) who
found that frequency of intrusions and other PTSD symptoms at initial
screening were correlated with enlargement of diminishment of recall of
sensory and emotional experiences (especially life threat) after a school
shooting.
Preliminary evidence for the role of interpretations of intrusive recollections
Wenninger and Ehlers (in preparation) conducted structured interviews of
35 adult survivors of child sexual abuse about their thoughts when experien-
cing recollections of the abuse. A subgroup of the women reported thoughts
indicating negative interpretations, e.g., "I am bad", "I am stupid", "I am
ugly", or "I am a failure, he was right". These women showed greater
severity of posttraumatic symptoms and more dysfunctional cognitions in
themes such as power, intimacy, self-respect, safety, and trust than women
who did not report negative automatic thoughts.
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accidents, Steil and Ehlers (in preparation) found that the vast majority still
experienced intrusive memories. Interestingly, 24% reported that they were
not distressed by these intrusions. The nondistressed group did not differ
from the distressed group in objective characteristics of the accident such
as severity of injuries or time since the accident had occurred.
This study and another study of 138 individuals involved in road traffic
accidents (Steil and Ehlers, in preparation) provided preliminary evidence
for the role of negative interpretations of intrusive memories. Question-
naires assessing catastrophic interpretations differed between the studies.
Study 1 was focused on the evaluation that intrusive memories meant that
the subjects' mental health was in danger ("I am going crazy"). In study 2,
a wider range of interpretations was assessed (e.g., "My life is ruined",
"Something is seriously wrong with me", "I will never get over this", "I
will not live long"). PTSD severity was assessed with the PTSD Symptom
Scale (PSS, self-report version) developed by Foa et al. (1993). Cognitive
and behavioural avoidance was assessed with a questionnaire specifically
designed for road traffic accidents by Steil and Ehlers (in preparation).
The following hypotheses were derived from our suggestions on the role
of interpretations of traumatic memories as outlined above:
1. The subjects' catastrophic interpretations of the intrusive traumatic
memories explain a proportion of the variance of recollection-related dis-
tress which is not explained by intrusion frequency. Results: In both studies,
highly significant partial correlations of r = .42 (p < .001) and r = .48 (p <
.001) were found.
2. The subjects' catastrophic interpretation of the intrusive traumatic
memories explains a proportion of the variance of how uncontrollable the
intrusive memories appear which is not explained by intrusion frequency.
Results: In study 1, a significant partial correlation of r = .21 (p - .01) was
consistent with this hypothesis. In study 2, two aspects of uncontrollability
were assessed separately, both of which showed significant partial corre-
lations with catastrophic interpretations, control over onset of recollections
(r = .41, p < .001) and ability to bring recollections to an end (r = .53, p <
.001).
3. The subjects' catastrophic interpretation of the intrusive traumatic
memories explains a proportion of the variance of behavioural and cognitive
avoidance which is not explained by intrusion frequency. Results: In both
studies partial correlations of r « .46 and r - .42 (ps < .001) were consistent
with this hypothesis.
4. PTSD severity is more closely related to distress caused by intrusive
recollections than intrusion frequency. Results: In study 1, frequency of232 A. Eblers and R. Steil
intrusive recollections showed a correlation with PTSD severity of r = .39
(p < .001). A significant correlation is to be expected because intrusive
recollections are one of the symptoms of PTSD and thus contribute to the
overall score. A significantly higher correlation was observed for distress
caused by intrusive recollections (r = .63, p < .001, difference t = 3.39, p <
.001, one-tailed). In study 2, the same result was obtained (r = .44 and r =
.59, respectively, difference t = 1.82, p < .05, one-tailed).
5. Catastrophic interpretations of traumatic memories are related to
severity of PTSD. Results: In study 1, catastrophic interpretations of intrus-
ive traumatic memories correlated with PTSD severity even if recollection
frequency was controlled for (partial correlation: r = .48, p < .001). In study
2, in which a wider range of catastrophic interpretations was assessed,
the partial correlation was r = .56 (p < .001). In this study, catastrophic
interpretations showed a stronger relationship to PTSD severity than fre-
quency of intrusive recollections (r = .61 vs. r = .44, t = 2.10, p < .05, one-
tailed).
All correlations between catastrophic interpretations and recollection-
induced distress, avoidance and PTSD severity remained significant when
indicators of the severity of the accident (e.g., severity of injuries) and of
the content of the intrusive recollections (e.g., number of dead or injured
people seen by the patient) were partialled out.
These results support our suggestion that it is useful to distinguish
between the occurrence of intrusive recollections, and the distress caused
by them. Catastrophic interpretations seem to play a role in explaining
recollection-related distress and PTSD-severity. We are currently conducting
a prospective longitudinal study of intrusive memories in PTSD in cooper-
ation with Dr Frommberger, University of Freiburg, Germany, to investi-
gate the predictive validity of interpretations of intrusions in accident
victims.
Relationship to other models
The idea that the interpretation of anxiety symptoms is a crucial factor in
maintaining anxiety disorders builds on previous work on panic disorder
(see Clark, 1986; Ehlers et al, 1988). Our particular suggestions for the
role of interpretations of intrusive memories are inspired by Rachman's
(Parkinson and Rachman, 1981; Rachman and de Silva, 1978) and Salkov-
skis's (1985) work on intrusive thoughts in patients with obsessive-compul-
sive disorder. Salkvoskis (1985, 1995) suggested that the misintepretation of
intrusions (termed negative automatic thoughts about intrusions in the 1985
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minsinterpretations occur will the individual find the intrusion distressing:
"The intrusions will only be expected to produce distress when they have
some (idiosyncratic) meaning or salience to the individual experiencing
them" (1985, p. 573), and "the discomfort experienced is due to the patient's
appraisal of the content and occurrence of intrusive thought" (Salkovskis
et al, 1995). The appraisal of intrusions in OCD centre on distorted beliefs
about responsibility, i.e., the belief that one has power which is pivotal to
bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes (Salkovskis
et al, 1995). According to Salkovskis (1985, Salkovskis et al, 1995) the
idiosyncratic meaning of the intrusions determines the degree to which
the individual engages in neutralization strategies, i.e. attempts to avoid or
reduce the possibility of being responsible for harm to oneself or others,
and in attempts at thought suppression. The neutralization strategies reduce
distress, but maintain the disorder by preventing changes in the underlying
dysfunctional beliefs about responsibility.
There are a number of important differences between intrusive memories
in PTSD patients and intrusions in patients with obsessions. These have to
be taken into account when applying Salkovskis's approach to a model of
maintenance of intrusive memories in PTSD:
1. The intrusive memories in PTSD concern a catastrophe that did really
happen whereas obsessive intrusions often concern hypothetical catas-
trophes that might happen in the future. The core interpretations in PTSD
centre around the threat that this horrible event implies for the individual's
future. In contrast, the core interpretations in OCD centre around the
patient's responsibility for future catastrophes or, if they concern a past
negative event, the patient's responsibility for minimizing the impact of this
event (Salkovskis, personal communication).
2. Whereas distress and physiological arousal in OCD is solely attributed
to automatic thoughts, the high physiological arousal that accompanies
intrusive memories in PTSD is probably, at least initially, a direct part of
the memory of the original event (see Foa et al.'s network model, 1989;
Creamer et al, 1992) and thus automatically activated (i.e., not only a
function of the distress caused by the interpretation). The high arousal may
contribute to the negative interpretations of the intrusions discussed above,
and may contribute to selective information processing (see suggestion 2)
and thus make it more difficult to incorporate new corrective information.
3. The intrusive recollections occur predominantly in the form of visual
images (see studies of Wenninger and Ehlers, in preparation, and Steil and
Ehlers, in preparation, described above). This may make the idiosyncratic
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were thoughts and therefore more difficult to change. The idiosyncratic
meaning may also be experienced in the form of visual images.
Vaughan and Tarrier (1992) have also suggested that Salkovskis's model
can be applied to PTSD. They described how PTSD patients often engage
in a cognitive commentary when they experience intrusive memories.
Examples of this cognitive commentary are a patient who thought about
the unfairness of his employer's attitude towards him after the robbery, or
a patient who ruminated about the murderer going free and nobody believ-
ing her. Vaughan and Tarrier made the important observation that these
preoccupations terminate exposure (p. 663), in other words, they terminate
the intrusive recollection. They also propose that this cognitive commentary
is similar to the automatic thoughts (or misinterpretations of intrusions)
described by Salkovskis for patients with OCD (p. 659).
However, the examples given in Vaughan and Tarrier (1992) do not
represent examples of interpretations of intrusive memories although they
probably reflect maladaptive beliefs. Instead, the cognitive commentary
resembles the rumination observed in patients with GAD (see Borkovec,
1985; Mathews, 1990). Thus, they are likely to represent a form of cognitive
avoidance (see suggestion 2) and are similar to the neutralization strategies
described in Salkovskis's model. We propose that a clearer distinction of
interpretations of intrusions and strategies used by the patient to control
their occurrence has the following advantages: it enables researchers to
investigate the functional role of interpretations in leading to strategies
that prevent emotional processing and recovery, it explains how adaptive
interpretations could facilitate recovery, and it makes it possible to concep-
tualize cognitive interventions designed to identify the idiosyncratic mean-
ing of intrusions and modify the underlying assumptions directly.
Other authors have also alluded to the possible role of cognitive process-
ing of PTSD symptoms in maintaining PTSD. For example, Horowitz
(1976) pointed out that the distress caused by intrusions depends on the
degree to which the recollections are perceived as controllable and that
uncontrollable intrusions can lead to retraumatization. Jones and Barlow
(1990) have developed a model of PTSD that assigns a central role to the
development of anxious apprehension about "learned alarms", i.e.,
emotional responses that resemble the original "true alarm" response to the
traumatic situation. Because learned alarms are experienced as unpredictable
and uncontrollable they lead to a state of hyperarousal and hypervigilance
for danger cues (see also Chemtob et al., 1988). Hyperarousal, like any
stress, increases the frequency of intrusive thoughts and images, many of
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this threatening and dangerous material (trauma related intrusive thoughts),
which might signal the onset of further uncontrollable emotional states,
would also play an important role in the downward spiral of negative affect,
paradoxically increasing, rather than decreasing, re-experiencing of trauma"
(p. 319). Jones and Barlow (1990) describe a process of maintenance of
trauma-related intrusive memories that involves repeated experiences of
uncontrollable, negative emotional states and hyperarousal, and the anxious
apprehension about repetitions of this experience which is accompanied by
selective information processing. Thus, Jones and Barlow (1990) provide a
framework for distinguishing between individuals who experience transient
symptoms of PTSD and those who develop chronic PTSD.
Chemtob et al. (1988) proposed a positive feedback loop between
thoughts and memories of threat (i.e., the trauma) and threat arousal that
leads to selective attention to threat cues. This attentional bias may lead to
the increased perception of reminders of the trauma, which in turn leads
to more threat arousal and more intrusions. Chemtob et al. (1988) also
mentioned that the perception of the physiological responses of threat
arousal may provide the individual with further evidence of danger (see
also Foa et al.'s model described below).
Jones and Barlow (1990) cite an interesting observation by McFarlane
who found that many PTSD patients fail to associate their current symptoms
with the traumatic experiences that ultimately led to the disorder. The lack
of attribution to trauma could be involved in maintaining PTSD because
symptoms are less predictable and cause more distress than if the cause was
known to the patient (similar to panic attacks, see Goldstein and Chambless,
1978). Another aspect may be that if subjects do not have information on
the source of their moods, they will evaluate their lives more negatively, as
demonstrated by Schwarz and Clore (1983). In PTSD patients, unexplained
symptoms of anxiety and depression may therefore contribute to the forma-
tion of negative beliefs about themselves or their world.
Foa et al. (1989) proposed that the meaning of fear response elements is
a crucial component of fear networks and that patients with anxiety dis-
orders assign negative meanings to fear responses ("badness", e.g., anxiety
is impossible to tolerate, anxiety will never end). Foa and Riggs (1993)
suggested that the presence of post-trauma symptoms is perceived by the
rape victim as a sign of incompetence and her inability to cope. This
perception in turn exacerbates PTSD symptoms.
Burstein (1989b) reported that experiencing psychological symptoms after
a road traffic accident is often perceived as embarrassing. Individuals for
whom anxiety and distress carry a high negative valence are more likely to
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changes the threat meaning linked to response elements as well as stimulus
elements. The patient experiences habituation during the sessions and the
"badness" of high arousal can be decreased through repeated exposure.
In summary, other authors have also pointed to the role of negative
meanings of PTSD symptoms in the maintenance of PTSD. A common
assumption is that they lead the individual to engage in avoidance of
reminders of the trauma and to selectively attend to potential signs of further
threat. The focus in the work of most other authors has been on negative
meaning of high arousal and unpleasant emotional states. We suggest that,
in addition to looking at the implication of high arousal, the idiosyncratic
meaning of having intrusive memories should be investigated.
Suggestion 2: Behavioural and cognitive processes used to control occurrence
of intrusive recollections
Since the pioneering work of Mowrer (1960), avoidance is the core construct
used to explain maintenance of anxiety disorders. Situational or cognitive
avoidance of reminders of the trauma are major symptoms of PTSD, but
may not be sufficient in explaining maintenance. Several authors have
pointed out that the concept of avoidance needs to be expanded in order
to explain maintenance of PTSD and have given examples of the processes
preventing recovery discussed in this section (e.g., Foa et al., 1989; Foa and
Riggs, 1993; Horowitz, 1976; Spiegel, 1991).
In order to determine processes that maintain intrusive recollections, it
is useful to consider mechanism of maintenance vs. recovery established for
other anxiety disorders. The emotional processing concept (Rachman, 1990)
provides a general framework for these considerations. Rachman (1990)
defined emotional processing operationally as "a process where emotional
disturbances are absorbed and decline to the extent that other behavior can
proceed without disruption" (p. 282) and "a return to ongoing behavior
after an emotional disturbance has waned" (p. 285), and gave examples
for factors that impede emotional processing. These include avoidance,
inadequate exposure or exposure under suboptimal conditions such as fati-
gue and persisting misinterpretations of threat.
What are the mechanisms of change in emotional processing? On the
basis of the efficacy of exposure treatments, one of the core mechanisms
proposed in the literature is habituation (see Foa and Kozak, 1986). Foa
and Kozak (1986) have linked the process of habituation to a cognitive
mechanism of change, i.e., the incorporation of new corrective information.
Other authors have also emphasized the role of corrective information, but
do not assume that fear arousal and habituation are necessary for achieving
change (Rachman, 1990). Another important concept linked to emotionalIntrusions in PTSD 237
processing is the disconfirmation of expected negative outcomes (expectancy
and avoidance: Seligman and Johnston, 1973; overprediction of fear and
pain: Rachman, 1990). From a cognitive perspective, exposure can be inter-
preted as a method to induce belief change by guided hypothesis testing
("behavioral experiments", see, for example, Clark, 1989).
A common denominator of the proposed mechanisms leading to
emotional processing is that they lead to a change in the maladaptive
idiosyncratic meaning of anxiety-inducing stimuli. We therefore suggest
maintenance of intrusive recollections can be explained by processes that
prevent change in the idiosyncratic negative meaning of the trauma and of
the intrusive recollections. In order to achieve a comprehensive assessment
of these processes it may be useful to distinguish two ways by which change
in meaning of traumatic memories may occur:
• New information changes the meaning the trauma or the intrusive mem-
ories have for the patient to the effect that the trauma is accepted by the
patient as part of their experience and that the negative implications of
the event and the recollections for the future are reduced.
• The organization of the memory structure is changed in a way that
facilitates a change in meaning of the trauma or the intrusive memories.
This change can concern the content of the memories (e.g., new important
aspects of the trauma are remembered such as the rapist having a knife;
the sequence of events is remembered such as the patient only complied
with the rapist after he had threatened to kill her; the memory becomes
less patchy) or the mode of representation of trauma in memory (e.g.,
transformation from a predominantly visual to a predominantly semantic
representation).
There are several different pathways by which strategies used by the
patient to control intrusive recollections interfere with a change of meaning
of the trauma and the intrusive recollections (examples of which are dis-
cussed in the sections below): First, failure to expose oneself to the traumatic
aspects of the event may lead to insufficient activation of the memory
structure (Foa et al., 1989) for the meaning of its components and its
organization to be changed (see section on rumination). Second, strategies
used to control intrusive recollections may maintain maladaptive beliefs
about the self, the world, and the meaning of symptoms (see section on
safety behaviours). Third, attempts to control intrusive recollections may
directly increase their frequency (see section on thought suppression). Fail-
ure of strategies to control the occurrence of intrusive recollections may be
perceived as uncontrollable and may be interpreted by the patient as further
evidence for maladaptive beliefs maintaining the disorder. Fourth, selective238 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
information processing may make it more likely that triggers of intrusive
recollections are perceived, and that negative aspects of the traumatic
memory and its sequelae are recalled and rehearsed.
On the basis of these considerations, we suggest considering the role of
the following processes in maintaining intrusive recollections of traumatic
events:
• behavioural processes: avoidance of reminders of trauma, not talking
about trauma, safety behaviours, alcohol and drug (ab)use;
• cognitive processes: avoiding thinking about trauma, dissociation and
numbing, suppression of memories and thoughts about trauma when
they occur, rumination (worry), activation of other emotions (such as
anger and guilt) and corresponding cognitions, attentional and memory
biases.
In the following, we will outline evidence collected so far on the role of
these processes in maintaining intrusive memories. If possible, we will
include preliminary ideas on the possible mechanisms of maintenance.
Not talking about the trauma. Foa et al. (1989) mentioned that one common
form of avoidance is refraining from talking about the trauma. DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) has included avoidance of conver-
sations about the trauma among the typical examples of avoidance. Penne-
baker (1989) conducted a series of studies showing that talking or writing
about traumatic or very distressing events leads to decreases in psychological
distress and has beneficial effects on subjects' health and immune function.
Steil and Ehlers (in preparation) found that, in road traffic accident victims,
reports of not being able to talk enough were related to PTSD severity
(study 1: r = .36,/> < .001; study 2: r = .19, p < .05). A 3-month prospective
study supported this finding (Winter and Ehlers, in preparation).
The mechanisms by which talking or writing lead to emotional processing
are not yet clear. According to Foa et al. (1989) one could assume that
talking activates the fear network and habituation occurs which leads to a
change in the fear structure. In addition, talking may help organizing frag-
mented memories (Foa and Riggs, 1993). However, contrary to the hypo-
thesis that the activation of the fear structure has to be accompanied by
arousal in order to be effective, Pennebaker (1989) found that disclosure
was related to low skin conductance levels. Pennebaker (1989) assumed that
not talking about a trauma is an effortful process (active inhibition) which
leads to increased arousal and failure to fully process the event. During
disclosure, active inhibition is given up which leads to a decrease in arousal.
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into language may be an important mechanism of change: "Once encoded
linguistically, individuals can more readily understand, find meaning in, or
attain closure of the experience". It is possible that the different predictions
derived from Foa et al.'s (1989) and Pennebaker's (1989) work are partly
due to the samples studied. It is also possible that different processes
of change operate. More data are needed on the relative contribution of
physiological arousal and habituation and the verbal account of a trauma
during exposure. The effectiveness of exposure treatment for PTSD
developed by Foa and colleagues (Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs and Murdock,
1991) does not allow one to decide between these components because
subjects imagine the rape and verbalize what they are imagining during
exposure.
Safety behaviours. Kilpatrick and Resnick (1993) mentioned that they
observed checking behaviour in crime victims similar to that observed in
OCD. Any excessive precautions taken by the individual to prevent further
trauma could be considered safety behaviours. Examples include not sleep-
ing in order to be able to detect an intruder, or driving very slowly in order
to prevent another accident. These safety behaviours prevent emotional
processing because they maintain the conviction that the individual is not
safe and that the trauma is likely to happen again. Patients believe that
another trauma would have occurred if they had not engaged in the safety
behaviour.
The concept of safety behaviours can also be directly applied to the
maintenance of negative beliefs about the meaning of intrusive recollections.
For example, a patient who interpreted his recollections as indicating he
might have a brain injury frequently did memory exercises and mental
arithmetic in order to improve his intellectual functioning. These exercises
maintained his belief that his brain would not function well without special
training.
Alcohol and drug (ab)use. As Schwartz (1990) pointed out, for some PTSD
patients use of various substances is a way to self-medicate the symptoms.
However, substance (ab)use prevents emotional processing and may even
exacerbate the PTSD symptoms. In line with this hypothesis, Feinstein and
Dolan (1991) found that subjects with high alcohol consumption were at
greater risk of developing PTSD after traumatic events involving injuries.
Dissociation. Dissociation during the trauma may be an adaptive response
as described by Spiegel (1991): "The essence of trauma is physical
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paramount. One way to maintain control is to distance oneself from one's
body" (p. 262). However, when used as a long-term strategy, dissociation
becomes maladaptive and perpetuates psychological and social maladjust-
ment (Spiegel, 1991, p. 265). Breslau and Davis (1992) found that detachment
from others distinguished between individuals with chronic and nonchronic
PTSD. Foa et al. (1989) proposed that cognitive strategies such as deper-
sonalization, emotional numbness, distractibility, and memory loss prevent
exposure to feared material and are not adaptive since they prevent
emotional processing. Foa et al. (1992) mentioned that these dissociative
symptoms are functionally similar to avoidance and escape behaviours since
they provide an escape from distress, although they may represent separate
factors according to recent results of Foa's group (Foa and Hearst-Ikeda,
in press). According to Foa and Riggs (1993) dissociation is employed when
active avoidance fails to reduce distress.
Spiegel (1991) elaborated on how dissociation could be involved in the
maintenance of intense reliving experiences such as flashbacks. He describes
that "There is an on-off quality to dissociative experiences" (p. 266). When
the flashbacks occur, patients experience them as if they were happening at
that moment and the subsequent history (what happened after the trauma)
is dissociated. The tendency of patients to dissociate needs to be taken into
account when treating PTSD patients. Foa and Hearst-Ikeda (in press)
concluded that therapeutic techniques directly aimed at reducing dis-
sociation are necessary in the treatment of PTSD patients who dissociated
during exposure therapy. For a recent review of the role of dissociation in
PTSD, see Foa and Hearst-Ikeda (in press).
Thought suppression. There is some, although not unequivocal, evidence
that suppression of unwanted thoughts may increase their frequency
(Wegner, 1989). Recent research shows that this applies to naturally occur-
ring intrusive thoughts (Salkovskis and Campbell, 1994; Trinder and Salkov-
skis, 1994). It is likely that these results are applicable to the attempt to
suppress the occurrence of trauma-related intrusive cognitions.
Rumination. PTSD patients frequently ruminate about issues like why the
trauma happened to them or how things could have been different if they
had done something differently. Analogous to worry in GAD (Mathews,
1990), this form of rumination may prevent emotional processing and could
thus be involved in maintaining PTSD. Borkovec, Shadick and Hopkin's
theory (1990) that the function of worry is to protect people from poten-
tially distressing imagery and corresponding physiological arousal may
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reduce intrusive images of the trauma and the corresponding arousal. This
suggestion is similar to Vaughan and Tarrier's (1992) suggestion that a
"cognitive commentary" prevents exposure to the CS, and in line with
Wells's (Wells, 1994; Wells and Matthews, 1994) suggestion that worrying
is a strategically driven conceptual activity for dealing with threat.
Because the rumination in PTSD concerns a past event, it is also different
from worry in GAD in several respects. In particular, it may be linked to
feelings of guilt and anger which are related to poor outcome (see below).
In addition, rumination may also change the memory structure because it
leads to selective recall of memories and the tendency to attend to infor-
mation consistent with feared outcomes (see Mathews, 1990). This sugges-
tion is similar to Wells's proposal (Wells, 1994; Wells and Matthews, 1994)
that, in addition to blocking effective emotional processing, worrying may
lead to generalization of retrieval cues for threat-related material in memory,
which increases the frequency of intrusions.
Consistent with a maintaining role of rumination, Steil and Ehlers (in
preparation) found correlations between subjects' reports that they rumi-
nated about a road traffic accident they had experienced and severity of
PTSD symptoms (study 1: r = .54, p < .001; study 2: r = .45, p < .001). A
prospective study showed that rumination assessed shortly after the accident
predicted PTSD severity three months later (Winter and Ehlers, in
preparation). In an experimental study, Wells and Papageorgiou (submitted)
found that verbal worry following exposure to a gruesome film increased
frequency of intrusions in the three days following the experiment compared
to a control condition (settling down).
The relationship of rumination with PTSD severity is especially interest-
ing because rumination is not among the DSM-IV symptoms and thus is
not a part of the assessment of PTSD severity. Future research will have to
determine whether rumination is indeed a strategy employed by PTSD
patients to avoid imagery and high arousal which prevents emotional pro-
cessing or whether it is just a correlate of more negative interpretations of
the event.
Other emotions and related cognitions. Foa and colleagues have demon-
strated that guilt and anger predict the maintenance of PTSD symptoms
(Riggs, Dancu, Gershuny, Greenberg and Foa, 1992; Riggs et al. 1991).
Furthermore, Foa, Riggs, Massie and Yarczower (in press) have recently
found that patients who reported more anger prior to treatment and dis-
played less fear during exposure therapy had a poor treatment outcome,
whereas facial expressions of anxiety predicted good outcome.
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others for threatening events is associated with impairments in emotional
well-being and physical health (Tennen and Affleck, 1990). Riggs et al.
(1992) explained the role of anger in maintaining PTSD in that anger inter-
feres with the modification of the traumatic memory. They assumed two
possible processes for this effect. First, an anger network is established
which shares many of its stimulus elements with the fear network and thus
is likely to be activated by similar stimuli. Activation of the anger network
inhibits fear responses, and, according to Foa et al. (1989), inadequate
activation of all elements of the fear network may prevent change. Second,
in the absence of external stimuli, intrusive thoughts and images of the
trauma activate fear that leads the individual to employ cognitive strategies
such as the activation of anger in order to avoid feelings of anxiety.
An additional aspect may be that guilt and anger only arise after the
traumatic event has occurred and if persistent may reflect problematic post-
event elaboration. For instance, ruminations about what the individual could
have done differently to prevent being raped and about her doubts whether
she did not in any way encourage the rapist would lead to guilt, and at the
same time prevent emotional processing of the fear and helplessness she
experienced during the rape. A person involved in a traffic accident may
ruminate about how unjust it is that the person causing the accident suffered
fewer injuries than he/she did and may get very angry about this. The focus
on the anger prevents the processing of traumatic aspects of the accident
such as threat to life. In both examples, the guilt or anger and corresponding
cognitions prevent the patient from accepting that the trauma has happened.
Alternatively, or additionally, anger and guilt may reflect problematic
beliefs (Foa and Clark, 1994; Resick and Schicke, 1993) that maintain PTSD.
The example of the accident patient indicates shattered assumptions about
how just the world is. Beliefs linked to anger are generally likely to reflect
themes of trust in others and power/control (Resick and Schicke, 1993) and
fairness (Foa and Clark, 1994). Guilt is linked to thoughts that the patient
has behaved or thought in a way that breaks his or her personal rules about
what is right and fair (Foa and Clark, 1994) and general beliefs about self-
worth (Resick and Schicke, 1993).
Attentional and memory biases. Possibly because of the classification of
PTSD as an anxiety disorder, research on information processing has largely
concentrated on attentional biases for trauma-related threat cues (e.g.,
Chemtob et al., 1988; Jones and Barlow, 1990; Litz and Keane, 1989. An
attentional bias favouring the processing of trauma-related information was
observed (e.g., Cassidy, McNally and Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock,
Kozak and McCarthy, 1991; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann and Zeitlin, 1990).Intrusions in PTSD 243
The attentional bias could increase the probability that cues triggering
traumatic recollections are perceived, and could thus be involved in the
maintenance of the intrusions.
Because traumatic memories concern a past event, and because several of
the symptoms of PTSD resemble those of depressed patients (e.g., dimin-
ished interest in significant activities, restricted range of affect), more
research is needed on memory biases. It is likely that some memory biases
observed in depressed patients are applicable to PTSD, for example, selective
recall of negative aspects of the patient's behaviour during the trauma, or
of responses of other people after the traumatic event. These memory
biases may also be involved in the maintenance of PTSD. In line with this
hypothesis, McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin and Weathers (1994) found a deficit
in retrieving specific autobiographical memories in Vietnam veterans with
PTSD similar to that observed in depressed patients.
Possible implications for treatment
If the correlational results from our research on individuals involved in
road traffic accidents on the role of intepretations of intrusive memories
are supported by further evidence from prospective studies, they underline
the need to assess frequency of symptoms, their interpretation, and distress
caused by them separately during the course of the disorder. Current scales
assessing severity of PTSD are measures of symptom presence/absence or
frequency (IES, Horowitz et al, 1979; PSS, Foa et al, 1993). In our research,
additional variance could be explained if separate frequency and distress
ratings were obtained. Measures of interpretations of intrusive recollections
and other PTSD symptoms may be important predictors of long-term
outcome in PTSD.
If future studies confirm our hypothesis that interpretations of intrusive
memories are involved in their maintenance, this has possible implications
for treatment. Cognitive therapy challenging the patient's negative interpre-
tation of their intrusive recollections directly may be a useful adjunct to
exposure and cognitive restructuring of the idiosyncratic meaning of the
trauma. Schwartz (1990) suggested treating intrusive recollections directly
by using thought stopping and thought substitution procedures. However,
these procedures have the disadvantages that they might reinforce the nega-
tive meaning the intrusive recollections have for the patient ("I am going
crazy") and that failure to stop the recollections can represent an experience
of uncontrollability. It is therefore preferable to challenge the meaning by
socratic dialogue and behavioural experiments (see Clark, 1989). Foa and
Clark (1994) give the example of a rape victim who experienced flashbacks
when she tried to have sex with her boyfriend. She interpreted the occur-244 A. Ehlers and R. Steil
rence of the flashbacks as meaning that she no longer had any sexual feelings
for her boyfriend. When this interpretation was challenged, she could see
that she had misinterpreted the fact that the flashbacks stopped her feelings.
If the full range of strategies that could prevent change in idiosyncratic
meaning of the trauma and of intrusive recollections are assessed in future
studies of PTSD, this is likely to improve the prediction of persistent PTSD.
The assessment and modification of the full range of strategies preventing
change in meaning may also improve treatment outcome. For example,
Vaughan and Tarrier (1992) describe that image habituation training, a form
of exposure therapy, was not successful in some patients who dissociated
or who focused on other emotions such as anger during the imagery.
Modifications of these strategies may be necessary in order to achieve
improvement (see Foa and Hearst-Ikeda, in press).
One might also speculate that the predominance of visual recollections
might have implications for treatment in that direct restructuring of the
visual images might be an important aspect of treatment.
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